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et al.: Panel Discussion

PANEL DISCUSSION OF SECTION 402A
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Professor Zablotsky has emphasized what has always been a

major part of the litigation process, that is, the inherent interaction between substance and procedure. When he began to discuss
the burden of proof regarding misuse, whether it should be a part

of the defendant's affirmative defense or plaintiff's prima facie
case, 1 I made a note to compare that with the disaster that the
courts have made out of shifting burdens in the employment
discrimination area. Soon afterwards, he turned around and used
that very same example to prove how right he was. I only hope,

as this area moves ahead in the law, that we do not get into the
handling of a prima facie case, defendant's burden, and plaintiff's burden. The burden shifts at this point, in the same way that
the employment discrimination area has shifted. What we have
done is taken what were originally trial concepts and moved them
back into the litigation process. In other words, like everything
1. See Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, 495 A.2d 348, 354-55 (Md. 1985);
Christopher H. Toll, The Burden of Proving Misuse in Products Liability
Cases, 20 COLo. LAw. 2307, 2308-11 (1991) (noting that "strict liability
focuses on the product rather than on the manufacturer's conduct," unlike in
negligence); see also Marchese v. Warner Communications, Inc, 670 P.2d
113, 116 (N.M. 1983) (stating that "[d]efendants have the burden of proving
[their] affirmative defenses..." and that misuse is one of those "defenses
previously allowed to be raised in [that] jurisdiction .... "); Kirkland v.
General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1366 (Okla. 1974) (suggesting that
misuse may "as a matter of proof be an affirmative matter...."); Jackson v.
Standard Oil Co., 505 P.2d 139, 149 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that
misuse is an affirmative defense and the burden falls on defendant). But see
Schwartz v. American Honda Motor Co., 710 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1983)
(stating that "[the] absence of misuse is part of plaintiff's proof of an
unreasonably dangerous condition or of proximate cause....."); Hughes v.
Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542, 548 (Iowa 1980) (holding that "misuse is
not to be treated injury instructions as an affirmative defense..." but rather
the "burden of proof [is] on [the plaintiff] ... ."); Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co.,
522 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that misuse "is not
properly a defense but a necessary element of plaintiff's cause of
action. ....
").
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else, we have turned the trial concept into motions and rules of
law. It is a field day for defense lawyers. A defendant can win on
a motion and need not have to face a jury at all with anything that
can be made a rule of law.
In the products liability area, where there is sufficient facts in
the affidavits to make out a prima facie case, but it has failed to
have been shown, the defendant still has to go forward. The defendant must establish or articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for what was done. If a defendant could establish such reason, then the burden would go back to the plaintiff, or maybe it was always on the plaintiff from the beginning.
These issues are resolved, not in the context of a trial, but in the
context of motions and this generates a lot of paper and a lot of
billing for clients.
I have noted from experience that when it comes down to the
ultimate question like plaintiff misuse, defective product, or
comparative negligence, when you try to charge a jury so it can
understand the law, it does not give two hoots about burden of
proof. Both sides have presented evidence as to what happened.
Now the jury has to decide from that evidence what really happened and how it will apportion responsibility. I cannot imagine
that any jury would say, "well, the plaintiff has the burden of
proof and has established it to the extent of forty-eight and a half
percent, and on the other side the defendant has established the
following percentages, and so on." Rather, it will simply come to
a conclusion. It looks at the whole thing and says so much here,
so much there, "let's go home."
ProfessorJames Henderson:

I have always wanted the "law of the jungle" 2 to return. First,
let me tell Professor Zablotsky, and the rest of you, how the
Committee thinks it will handle misuse. 3 I had not planned to di2. "As usually understood... the law of the jungle is the law of might
over right." THE MACMILLAN BOOK OF PROVERBS, MAXIMS, AND FAMOUS
PHRASES 1368 (Burton Stevenson ed. 1948).
3. See generally 6 STUART M. SPEISER Er AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF
TORTS § 18:158 (1989). The authors stated:
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vulge as much of this as I have, and the rest of the Committee is
going to get me for it, but here I go. I will not show the draft,
but I will say that it does not have misuse as a separate doctrine
nor will it exist anywhere else in the law; we are blasting it to the
moon. Let me tell you what is going to take place. I do not think
it will upset you as much as you might expect. Additionally, I
would distinguish between the burden of production 4 and the
burden of persuasion. 5 The burden of persuasion will be on the
plaintiff in the revised section 402A. However, as I wrote when I

was untenured at Boston University, as a practical matter, the
burden of production or the proximate causation issue should be
on the defendant. 6 If the plaintiff can show but-for cause and efMisuse has been variously defined as a use of a product not intended
and/or not reasonably foreseeable; a use of a product for an abnormal
purpose; a use or handling so unusual that the average consumer could
not reasonable have expected a product to be designed and manufactured
to withstand it-a use that the seller, therefore, need not anticipate and
provide for; or a use of the product that constitutes willful or reckless
misconduct or an invitation of injury. Moreover, product misuse may
consist of a change in design so that the product is not in the same
condition as it was in when it was manufactured.
Id.
4. See BLAcK's LAWv DICTIONARY 196 (6th ed. 1990). The burden of
production is:
The obligation of a party to introduce evidence sufficient to avoid a
ruling against him on the issue ....Such burden is met when one with
the burden of proof has introduced sufficient evidence to make out a
prima facie case, though the cogency of the evidence may fall short of
convincing the trier of fact to find for him. The burden of introducing
some evidence on all the required elements of the crime or tort or
contract to avoid the direction of a verdict against the party with the
burden of proof.
Id.
5. Id. The burden of persuasion is when "the onus [is] on the party with
the burden of proof to convince the trier of fact of all elements of his case."
Id.
6. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping With the ime Dimension in
ProductsLiability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919, 955 (1981):
The plaintiff should.., be required to show that the purchaser's
commitment to the old technology was the proximate cause of his
injury. The recovery should be denied when the defendant shows that a
cost-effective switch to the newer, safer technology was available to,
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fect, which a plaintiff can do in most of the cases that are bother-

some, then it is the defendant that has to bring in proof to refute
causation.
This result was beyond the risk, which is the way Prosser explained it in his treatise. 7 He cited two cases, each in which a
child drowned in a swimming pool without a lifeguard. 8 The respective families brought lawsuits which asked, as their main legal questions, whether their respective children would have
drowned if there had been a lifeguard on duty. 9 Prosser said,

practically speaking, that the defendants ought to have the burden
of suggesting, based on credible evidence, that a lifeguard would
have saved the child. 10 Put differently, there should be a presumption which favors the plaintiffs on the second proximate
cause issue about the lifeguard saving the drowning child. Thus,

when the plaintiff has proven breach, causation, and affirmative
defenses, the defendant should have a one fourth bite at the apple. The Committee is making this very explicit in the comments
of the revision and in the reporter's notes.
Moving right along, I want to chastise Professor Madden for
his statement about the Washington case, Ayers v. Johnson &
Johnson Baby Products Co. 11 He mentioned the ingestion of
and refused by, the person in control of the product when the risk
avoidance measures became available.
7. See W. PAGE KEErON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS.
8. See id. at § 41, at 270 n.55 (5th ed. 1984) (citing Rovegno v. San Jose
Knights of Columbus Hall Ass'n, 291 P.2d 848 (Cal. 1930) (holding that it is
a matter of speculation for the jury as to what would have happened had a
lifeguard been present) and R.A. Blacka v. James, 139 S.E.2d 47, 50 (Va.
1964) (holding that "[t]he negligence of the defendant must have a causal
connection with the drowning, and in the absence of a showing that a
defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the death there can be no
recovery .... ")).
9. Rovegno, 291 P.2d at 849; R.A. Blacka, 139 S.E.2d at 48.
10. See KEErON Er AL., supra note 7, at 270.
11. 797 P.2d 527 (Wash. 1990). The Ayers court reasoned that the
manufacturer of baby oil, who did not place a warning on the label about the
oil being dangerous if inhaled into a person's lungs, could be found liable
based on failure to warn if the family testified that they would have kept the
baby oil out of reach had such a warning been included. id. at 529.
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baby oil, implying to some of you that the baby "chug-a-lugged"
a pint of the stuff and went brain dead. I will briefly discuss the
facts of this case. Laurie Ayers, the older sister of 5-year-old
toddler David Ayers, put some baby oil in a little bottle in her
purse, which she intended to rub on her hands after gym class. 12
She left the purse on the floor in her bedroom. 13 David found the
purse, opened it, and took out the bottle of baby oil. 14 Just as
David began to drink the baby oil, his mother entered the room15
and yelled at David to stop. 16 Because he was startled, the child
may have inhaled quickly and sucked the baby oil into his
lungs. 17 Mrs. Ayers was relieved when she realized it was baby
oil. 18 She thought the only effect would be diarrhea. 19 She read
the bottle and there was no warning. 2 0 She told her two other
children to call her at work if David seemed to be getting ill. 2 1
When a person sucks any oil or viscous fluid into his or her
lungs, that person cannot breathe. 22 The person appears to be
breathing, but the air is not getting through the capillaries to the
body. 23 However, the person will not collapse immediately. 24
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
1d.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
21. Id.
22. See J.C. Cunningham et al., Lipoid Pneumonia Secondary to Baby Oil
Aspiration: A Case Report and Review of the Literature, PEDIATRIC
EMERGENCY CARE, June 1985, at 76.

The severity of the acute phase of the condition, progressive
deterioration, and compromised oxygenation of the patient can be
explained on the basis of pathophysiologic changes in airways, alveoli,
and interstitial tissues produced by the oil. These changes, which are

responsible for a ventilation-perfusion imbalance and decreased lung
compliance, resulted in severe hypoxemia and prolonged need for
supplemental oxygen.

Id.
23. Id.
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It was not until later that evening when the child was having
trouble breathing that the family rushed him to the hospital. 25
There is a special machine for the purpose of cleaning the inside
of lungs when viscous fluid gets into them. 26 The hospital tried
to clear out his lungs, however the child suffered severe and
permanent side effects. 27 This heartbroken family brought an action against Johnson & Johnson, the manufacturer of the baby
oil. 28
In this case there is neither a long latency problem 29 nor a limit
of knowledge problem. 30 The hospital had a machine to clean the
lungs. 3 1 In my view, the legal problem was that Johnson & John24. Paul

M.

Wax,

Hydrocarbons, in

COMPREHENSIVE STUDY GUIDE

EMERGENCY

MEDICINE

A

601, 602 (Judith E. Tintinally et al. eds., 3d

ed. 1992) ("Most fatalities from these complications occur within 24
h[ours].").
25. Ayers, 797 P.2d at 529.
26. Id. This procedure is called ECMO therapy. It is a "special procedure
that involves pumping the patient's blood outside his body and mechanically
enriching it with oxygen." Id.
27. Id. David suffered "cardiac arrest" which "led to brain damage. David
cannot now move his arms or legs, cannot speak, suffers seizures, and is
mentally retarded." Id.
28. Id.
29. See Amy B. Blumenberg, The Periodic Payment of Future Medical
Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661
(1992). "The latency period is the time between exposure and the appearance
of symptoms." Id. at 668 n.32. Certain injuries such as toxic tort injuries go
undetected for years due to long latency periods during which time the ailment
cannot be "clinically diagnosed." id. at 661. As a result of a long latency
period, a victim who has been exposed to a toxic substance may not bring an
action until termination of the latency period. Id. In Ayers, the parents learned
of the baby's ingestion of the baby oil within several hours; therefore, no long
latency problem existed in this case. Ayers, 797 P.2d at 529.
30. See 5 SPEISER Er AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §18.25, at 68586 (1988) (In certain cases a manufacturer has no duty to warn if the
"product's dangerous propensity" was unknown and incapable of being known
based on "the present state of human knowledge."). There is no limit of
knowledge problem here because the dangers associated with the ingestion of
mineral oil are known. "One of the most serious of mineral oils properties is
its capacity to destroy the process by which lungs rid themselves of foreign
materials." Ayers, 797 P.2d at 532.
31. Ayers, 797 P.2d at 529.
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son did not have a warning on the bottle of baby oil which would
have informed the mother that ingestion of this substance would
be dangerous. 32 The mother testified at trial that if there had been
a warning on the bottle of baby oil by the company that she
would have kept it out of reach of her children. 33 However, the
problem with the argument, from a proximate cause standpoint,
is that the sister intervened. 34 Therefore, an action of failure to
warn will not be successful.
These cases do not arise very often and will not put companies
out of business. 35 My estimate is that this type of situation probably occurs, in major cities, twelve times a year. Additionally,
there are strange types of medical emergencies that occur, ones
that are surprising. For example, there is a machine in most
emergency rooms which is designed to take pool balls out of
mouths. No kidding. In bars, after people have had a few beers,
they make bets like, "I bet I can put this pool ball in my mouth."
When the ball gets into the mouth, the jaws clench up and the
ball gets stuck. It happens often enough in New York City that
there is a machine which removes the ball from the mouth. Without this machine, in order to remove the ball, the teeth have to be
pulled.
What happened to the child in Ayers was not only foreseeable,
the industry, itself, saw it coming. 36 If the company had checked
32. Id. at 530. In fact, that was the problem. The court stated that

"because the product was without a warning, the family members did not
know it was dangerous and so did not treat it as such." Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id. at 533 (Reed, J., dissenting) ("Beyond cavil, the risk in this case
was exceedingly remote: from 1932 to the time of the accident in 1985,

Johnson & Johnson had sold over 500 million bottles of baby oil without a
single report of aspiration.").
36. ld. at 532. Johnson & Johnson knew that if baby oil was inhaled the
result would be serious. The court stated:
One of the most serious of mineral oil's properties is its capacity to
destroy the process by which the lungs rid themselves of foreign
particles. Cells called macrophages surround a foreign substance in the
lung whether it is milk, water, oil, or some solid substance, and carry it
away from the lungs. The Ayerses produced testimony based on the
literature concerning oils in the lungs that showed these macrophages
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the records, it would have known that children do inhale baby
oil, not with regularity, but it is not a once-in-a-lifetime occurrence. What was not foreseeable were all the facts of failure to
warn. 37

cannot rid the lungs of oil. While the macrophages initially surround the
oil, they cannot absorb it. The macrophages give up and release the oil
back into the lungs. Given this potential for serious harm, the burden on
Johnson & Johnson, essentially the cost of printing and affixing a
warning label, seems light indeed.
Id. The analysis by the court culminated with the conclusion that it was a
foreseeable risk for Johnson & Johnson. The court stated:
First the focus is on the product, and the question is whether the
product is 'not reasonably safe.' The answer is found by balancing the
likelihood that the product would cause the harm complained of (and the
seriousness of that harm must be taken into account here) against the
burden on the manufacturer in providing an adequate warning. In this
case, that balancing involves the following factors: the product is called
baby oil; it is for use on babies; it is described as 'pure and gentle'; and
it bears a label suggestion that it be used on baby's scalp, which, of
course is near both the mouth and nose. Although it may be unlikely
that the product will cause harm of the gravity experienced here,
nevertheless the seriousness of the risk is extremely great considering
what mineral oil can do when aspirated.
Id. The court then considered, as a second step for the foreseeability question,
"whether the product was unsafe beyond the expectations of the ordinary
consumer." Id. The court stated that it believed:
[O]nly two factors need be considered in a failure to warn case: (1)
nature of the product, and (2) deficiency of the warning. Here, the
product was composed of an oil that has the potential for great harm if it
gets into the lungs, but is nevertheless promoted for use on and around
babies. The warning was not merely deficient, it was nonexistent.
Id. at 532-33.
37. This statement reflects the view of the dissent. The dissent framed the
problem by stating:
Was the likelihood of aspiration together with the gravity of the harm
sufficient to impose a duty on the defendant to guard against that
danger?... I would hold that the risk of harm in this case was
insufficient to impose a duty upon Johnson & Johnson [to include any
warning about the dangers of aspiration].
Id. at 535-36 (Reed, J., dissenting); see also Michael S. Jacobs, Toward A
Process-BasedApproach to Failure-to-WarnLaw, 71 N.C. L. REV. 121, 127
(1992) ("The conventional formulation of failure-to-warn law requires that a
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When I teach this case in class, I look around the room. The
students know that I am a middle-of-the-roader, and I say that the
facts in Ayers do not show a defective design. 3 8 We do not want
the companies to redesign baby oil to make it safe to breathe in
your lungs. However, I think this defers on kind of a social insurance basis. This will not put the company down.
There are other cases where children ingest. What is your reaction to this situation? A child is eating a sandwich at supper. It is
buttered on one side and there is peanut butter on the other side.
He is young enough that all of a sudden the peanut butter gets
stuck in his throat. He does a number, sort of like the plaintiff in
Ayers. 39 Well, when the grief stricken mother comes in she
claims she should have been warned about the danger of the peanut butter. Does this mean that there needs to be a warning on
peanut butter jars?
ProfessorM. Stuart Madden:
I appreciate the facts in Ayers. That is surely true. However, I
had not meant to cite Ayers as an example of a case that fell into

manufacturer provide consumers with an adequate warning of risks associated

with the use of its product.").
38. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 7, § 99, at 698-99:

Much of the difficulty related to products liability litigation centers
around the meaning of defect in the kind of way that makes a product
unreasonably dangerous in relation to design hazards. There are
essentially two different approaches that have been utilized in evaluating
design hazards - a consumer-purchaser or consumer-user contemplation

test and a risk-utility test ....Under the consumer-contemplation
test... a product is defectively dangerous to an extent beyond that

which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchased
it with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the
product's characteristics ....Under [the danger-utility test], a product
is defective as designed if, but only if, the magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility of the product.
Id.
39. See supra notes 11-36 and accompanying text.
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the category for which I proposed a reverse of strict products liability. 4o
ProfessorJames Henderson:
Everything about the accident in Ayers was scientifically knowable, but who would have thought the child would swallow the
baby oil? I do not want to clutter baby oil bottles with warnings
like "do not let your child breathe this in."
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Does the audience have any questions?
Audience Member:
Baby oil is a baby product that is going to be in a baby's room,
nursery, or bathroom. Most baby products do have a label like
"do not ingest," "do not let baby ingest," or "not for oral consumption." Baby oil should have some warning on it.
ProfessorJames Henderson:
Then what about causation? I am pro-plaintiff in this instance
with all of you, alright? This type of lawsuit will not put Johnson
& Johnson out of business because a situation like this happens so
rarely. Additionally, are you going to call it a flaw? It is not a
technical flaw, and at most it may have been a mismatch of product and user in a tragic way. I cannot believe that if there was a
40. See generally M. Stuart Madden, Section 402A: "Don't Throw the
Baby Out With the Bathwater" 10 TOURO L. REv. 123 (1993). The author
stated:
For products that cause long latency personal physical injuries,
by ...ingestion, [or] inhalation... elimination of the state-of-the-art
defense or the state of scientific knowledge defense, and imposition of
true strict tort liability, would preserve the progress of section 402A
where anything less would not adequately protect injured individuals
Id. at 147.
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warning on the baby oil bottle saying "do not let baby ingest,"
that Mrs. Ayers would have either not bought the baby oil or
would have put it in a secret place like it was poison. Additionally, Laurie put it in her purse. 4 1 Would she have known about
the warning anyway? 42
Audience Member.
The bottle of baby oil should say "call a paramedic or poison
control if ingested." Most baby products do say "call poison
control or a paramedic immediately if ingested."
ProfessorJames Henderson:
The other argument which could have been made by the plaintiffs in Ayers was a post-trauma argument, which is different
from a pre-trauma warning which would initially prevent the
children from going near the product. 43 The plaintiffs could have
argued that the company could have added a warning to bottles of
baby oil stating that if the consumer has any reason to think a
child has ingested it, to seek immediate medical attention. You
see, the plaintiffs sat around all afternoon and into the evening
with no idea that there was any risk to their child other than diarrhea. 44 There is a time of sale decision and a post-trauma decision. That post-trauma branch of failure to warn is one which I
think would have been successful in Ayers.
41. Ayers, 797 P.2d at 529.
42. 1l at 530. The court stated that Mrs. Ayers testified that "she was a
label reader and that had she known of the risks of aspiration, everyone else in
the family would have known also." Id. Mr. Ayers testified that "products
known to be dangerous were kept up on a top shelf out of reach [and that if

the] product carried a warning of the risks, they would not have had it in the
house." Id. In fact, Laurie testified that "Mrs. Ayers told all the family

members to keep items known to be dangerous away from [David]." Id.
43. Id. The Ayerses argued that they would have either put the baby oil
out of reach or not bought it at all if there had been a warning on the label

which stated the risks which resulted to their son David. Id.
44. Id. at 529.
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ProfessorM. Stuart Madden:
The antidote syndrome.
Audience Member
In the case you are talking about, how often does the oil go
into the lungs, as opposed to going into the stomach? Was that a
rare occurrence?
ProfessorJames Henderson:
To be honest, if you had one hundred children, each with a little bottle of baby oil, and each child put the bottle in his mouth,
ninety-nine point nine percent of the time the baby oil would go
into the stomach. 45 There has to be perfect timing. 46 The child
has a bottle to his lips, the mother screams at him, and then the
child sucks it up and boom. It could not be replicated if you
tried, and it would be a gruesome experiment.
Audience Member:
This is not foreseeable and this would not be foreseeable.

45. See Cunningham, supra note 22, at 75 (presenting aspiration of baby
oil as an unusual cause of acute respiratory distress in children); Wax, supra

note 24, at 601 ("Viscosity is measured in Saybolt Seconds Universal (SSU).
Patients ingesting substances with viscosities less than 60 SSU are at greater
risk for aspiration than those ingesting substances with viscosities greater than
100 SSU."); Anthony J. Scalzo et al., ExtracorporealMembrane Oxygenation

for Hydrocarbon Aspiration, Am. J. DISEASES OF CHILDREN, Aug. 1990, at
867 ("A 15-month-old male infant who aspirated baby oil (light mineral oil) is
particularly unusual owing to the generally expected low risk of aspiration
with a hydrocarbon of such viscosity ([greater than] 60 Saybolt Universal
Seconds).").
46. See generally Scalzo et al., supra note 44.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss1/11

12

et al.: Panel Discussion

1993]

PANEL DISCUSSION

223

ProfessorJames Henderson:
That is the point. I agree with Professor Madden. We are not
far apart on this, but I disagree with him for citing Ayers for the
proposition of an unknowable risk.
Audience Member.
One more thing. You are talking about social insurance. I get
the feeling you are saying that, because the companies are able to
afford it, we should shift this cost onto them. Is that what you are
saying?
ProfessorJames Henderson:
There are more reasons than that. When you tell me there is an
unknowable risk, whether it is either a risk related to the use of
drugs or toxins, then I see a picture where companies cannot insure. However, what will occur after the fact is that the companies will be dismantled and will pay only ten cents on the dollar
to the victims. One hundred cents on the dollar will be paid to the
first few plaintiffs that get a reward and nothing else to the rest.
This puts the company down. However, it will not, in my view,
insure.
If I were the corporate counsel and there was such a rule, I
would begin to organize companies with subsidiaries to handle
the risky stuff. However, it would be difficult for drug companies to do that because they would not know which drug would
be the next disaster. Maybe I should get out of the business of
counseling corporations, but there are ways around it.
Audience Member.
I can see how, in the scenario you have given us, product misuse would be inappropriate and unfair. You were equitable to the
plaintiff. Would product misuse be appropriate in a situation
where a defendant who uses a car battery to power some small
toy, electrocutes himself?.
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ProfessorJames Henderson:
You are talking about a car battery he is using to what?
Audience Member.
For something other than putting it in a car.
ProfessorJames Henderson:
I would first ask myself, "is the battery defective because it can
do this?" Should there be a warning against this? If there should
be a warning, then, the next consideration should be proximate
cause. After that, there is the consideration of but-for causation. 4 7 The defendant must persuade the judge that there is
enough evidence to make out a prima facie case and get to the
jury. 4 8 If misuse is used as an independent defense, my sense is
that some courts will be lured into going all the way through the
trial, and the plaintiff will succeed, and now what about this new
defense? It is four bites at three apples.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
In the interest of ultimately bringing this to a conclusion, I
would like to invite each panel member, in turn, for any final
comments they might have. Mr. Crofton, I will start with you.
Do you have anything you wish to add to what has been said?

47. KEETON Er AL., supra note 7, § 41, at 266 ("[Under the 'but for'
rule] [t]he defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not
have occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is not
a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it.").
48. KEETON Er AL., supra note 7, at 269-70 ("The plaintiff must introduce
evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more
likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the
result ....
The plaintiff is not, however, required to prove the case beyond a
reasonable doubt.").

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss1/11

14

et al.: Panel Discussion

1993]

PANEL DISCUSSION

225

Michael Crofton, Esq.:
I would just like to second what Professor Henderson had to
say about the social insurance question, 4 9 and I think this is

something that needs to be clearly understood. The questioner in
the back raised the issue.

Ultimately, and I have indicated this during my talk, somebody
has got to pay the price of giving coverage in circumstances

where it just does not make sense to impose coverage or compensation responsibilities on insurance companies and corporations.
When Professor Henderson mentioned you get ten cents on the
dollar, that is essentially what has occurred in certain circumstances today. Johns-Manville 5 0 and the various Dalkon Shield

cases51 have let the solvency of major corporations go. 52 What
49. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Revising Section 4024: The Limits of
Tort as Social Insurance, 10 TouRo L. REv. 107, 119-20 (1993). Professor
Henderson feels that the tort system does not work as a social insurance system
as it is more pro-lawyer than pro-consumer. He feels that payments are made
on a "random, unfair, speculative basis," and that costs should be contained by
lowering the price of insurance. Id.
50. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.
1992) (class action complaint seeking review of obligation payment procedures
under settlement trust created pursuant to the Johns-Manville Corporation's
confirmed Chapter 11 plan); Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d
1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (action by asbestos manufacturer seeking
indemnification from United States for liability to shipyard workers exposed to
United States sold asbestos), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989); MacArthur
Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.) (movement by
manufacturer for approval of proposed settlement with insurers and for order
enjoining all future suits against insurers pertaining to settled policies), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 40 B.R. 219
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (affirming bankruptcy court's order of automatic stay
prohibiting a co-defendant of the Johns-Manville Corporation from obtaining
pre-trial discovery documents for its own use in suits from which debtor was
severed); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 32 B.R. 728 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(holding that fact that debtor petitioned for Chapter 11 does not per se prohibit
debtor from lobbying for proposed legislation for resolving damage claims of
asbestos litigants).
51. See In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1988) (allowing
class certification and settlement where products liability plaintiff brought
action against manufacturer's insurer as joint tortfeasor), cert. denied sub
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you have got is the residual matter of unprotected groups. At that
point, society has got to bite the bullet and say, "Are we going to

make the compensation of certain injured consumers a matter of
general taxpayer responsibility?" Of course, once you start doing
that, you throw the question into the political arena and the
democratic process must make the decision as to how much we
care about these people. What Professor Henderson was saying is
that if you are a Hillary Clinton supporter, you would like to see
society bite the bullet and pay the cost for that type of coverage.
If, however, you chose not to go that route, and say the tort

system must provide coverage in every circumstance, you must
understand some realities. That is, the tort system is extremely
53
inefficient in the way it utilizes dollars to compensate people.
nom., Anderson v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989);
Hawkinson v. A. H. Robins Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Colo. 1984)
(consolidated action for injuries resulting from use of Dalkon Shield
manufactured by defendant); Lebeda v. A. H. Robins Co., 101 F.R.D. 689
(D. Me. 1984) (suit brought against defendant under various theories of
liability, such as negligence and strict liability, for injuries resulting from use
of the Dalkon Shield); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD
Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (permitting suit by
thousands of women injured by allegedly defective Dalkon Shield), vacated,
693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); Palmer v. A. H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187
(Colo. 1984) (approving jury award of $6.2 million in punitive damages to
woman harmed by Dalkon Shield).
52. On August 21, 1985, A. H. Robins Co., the manufacturer of the
Dalkon Shield, filed a petition for re-organization relief under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988). For an explanation of
the details surrounding the bankruptcy proceedings, see In re A. H. Robins
Co., 88 B.R. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988). Furthermore, Aetna Casualty & Surety
Company, A. H. Robins' insurance company, had to make "'$70,000,000.00
available to Robins beyond the face value of the Aetna policies'" to cover
Robins' debts. In re A. H. Robins Co., 846 F.2d 267, 268 (4th Cir. 1988).
Additionally, the Johns-Manville Corporation, the world's largest
manufacturer of asbestos, filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under
Chapter 11 on August 26, 1982, as a result of claims from current and future
injuries estimated at two billion dollars. For a full explanation of the
proceedings, see In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721. See
also Robert Rice, Reinsurers Reeling from Red-Line Entries, FIN. TIMEs, Oct.
15, 1993, at 6 (noting the bankruptcies of Johns-Manville and A.H. Robins).
53. See Tillinghast, Tort Cost Trends: An International Perspective 8
(1992). The Tillinghast survey is an update of prior surveys done on the
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Out of each dollar the tort system costs in the United States, the
defense bar gets eighteen cents. 54 Plaintiffs' bar gets fifteen
cents, 55 various other costs are twenty-four cents, 56 and the
plaintiff gets forty-three cents. 57 It is a ridiculous way to use
money to compensate people. It just does not make any sense. I
am trying to give you a flavor of what we are talking about,
whereas a properly run social insurance system that puts myself
and plaintiffs' lawyers out of business can actually end up giving
the plaintiffs ninety or eighty-five cents on the dollar. That is a
vast improvement. Therefore, I endorse what Professor Henderson said in that regard. 5 8
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Professor Phillips, do you have any comment?

United States tort system. The survey encompasses the years 1933 through
1991. The key findings of the survey include: the United States tort system
cost $132 billion in 1991; in the past 58 years tort costs have risen four times
faster than the United States economy; the United States tort system is the most
expensive in the industrialized world; and, "[w]hen viewed as a method of
compensating claimants, the U.S. tort system is highly inefficient, returning
less than 50 cents on the dollar to the people it is designed to help .... ." Id. at
3; see also Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk
Choice, 42 EMoRY L.J. 1, 127 (1993) (stating that a national health insurance
system "might prove preferable to the current system's dependency on the
vagaries of the private liability insurance market... and the inefficient and
unequally allocated... insurance system"); Robert Sugarman, Doing Away
with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 555, 591-96 (1985) (criticizing the current
tort compensation system for its arbitrariness, its excessive compensation to
certain victims, as well as its failure to compensate altogether, or under
compensate, victims of certain torts).
54. Tillinghast, supra note 53, at 8.
55. Tillinghast, supra note 53, at 8.
56. Tillinghast, supra note 53, at 8.
57. Tillinghast, supra note 53, at 8.
58. See Henderson, supra note 49.
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ProfessorJerry Phillips:
In general, I would like to make one comment, and it is a
question to Professor Henderson. Going back to the consumer
expectation test, which I think, on the whole, works better than
the risk-utility test as the standard informed by presumed seller
knowledge. This test has been criticized because the consumer

has no expectation of safety for obvious dangers. 5 9 I do not think
that is true, particularly since we have eliminated obvious dan-

gers as a bar to recovery as a matter of law in the New York
case, Micallef v. Miehle Co. 60 A consumer certainly expects the
product to be safe and to be usable in the workplace, even though
he knows he is confronted with danger everyday. In many of the
complicated design cases, the consumer has no expectation until
he is informed by expert testimony. 6 1 This is exactly the same as

in a negligence case. The negligence jury, which represents the
ordinary consumer or the ordinary reasonable person, has no expectation of what a doctor, for example, can do, until it is informed by expert testimony. 62 Likewise, in consumer product
59. See Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 978 F.2d 1386, 1389 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding that "an open and obvious danger to an ordinary user precludes
recovery against product manufacturer under negligence and strict liability in
tort."); Toney v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 975 F.2d 162, 166 (5th Cir. 1992)
(stating that if product defects were open and obvious, then plaintiff is barred
from recovery); Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 491 N.W.2d
208, 214 (Mich. 1992) (stating that there is no duty to warn of product risks
that are open and obvious).
60. 39 N.Y.2d 376, 379, 348 N.E.2d 571, 573, 348 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117
(1976) (stating that "[t]he time has come to depart from the patent danger
rule....").
61. See generally Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d 1033,
1034 (Or. 1974). At least one court has suggested that a "knowledgeable seller
test" be substituted for the consumer expectations test under such
circumstances. id. The court in Phillips defined a dangerously defective
product as "one which a reasonable person would not put into the stream of
commerce if he had knowledge of its harmful character." Id. at 1036
(emphasis in original).
62. Lutz v. Foran, 427 S.E.2d 248, 250 (Ga. 1993) (stating that in
medical malpractice actions, plaintiff must present expert testimony so that
jury can determine acceptable professional conduct); Benison v. Silverman,
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cases, the jury can also be informed by the testimony of experts. 63
As Professor Twerski mentioned again this morning, Professor
Henderson spoke about the area of conscious design decision as
an area in which the courts and the juries should practice a handsoff policy. If we have the time, and if you care to reply, Professor Henderson, I would be curious to hear you explain what your
position is on the conscious design decision today, and how it
should be treated in products law.
ProfessorJames Henderson:
In 1973, just as strict products liability began to be used in design defect cases, I wrote an article in the Columbia Law Review, 64 urging courts to stay away from such cases. 65 The only
type of cases which I thought were worthy of review were what I
called "inadvertent design cases." 66 Those are similar to the case
599 N.E.2d 1101, 1104 (I11. App. 3d 1992) (explaining that expert testimony
is needed in "malpractice because jurors are not skilled in the practice of
medicine"); Fabio v. Bellomo, No. C6-91-2542, 1993 Minn. LEXIS 558, at
*8 (Aug. 20, 1993) (stating that in medical malpractice action, plaintiff must
present expert testimony to establish standard of care applicable to defendant).
63. Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1100 (10th Cir. 1991)
(stating that for technical aspects of case, expert testimony was necessary to
assist jury in reaching its decision) (citing Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817
F.2d 1452, 1459 (10th Cir. 1987)).
64. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers'
Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
1531 (1973).
65. Id. "[A]

significant

problem

area... in

products

liability

law.., involves the judicial handling of cases concerning conscious design
choice." Id. at 1552. "Courts should resist the pressures to adjudicate the
reasonableness of conscious design choices, and give in only in those few cases
where the polycentricity of the question can be narrowed and a judicial
resolution appears preferable to no solution at all." Id. at 1577.
66. Id. at 1548-52. Inadvertent design errors are errors where the design
engineers inadvertently fail to "appreciate adequately the implications of the
various elements of [the] design, or to employ commonly understood and
universally accepted engineering techniques to achieve the ends intended
without regard to the product." Id. at 1548. These cases are worthy of review
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that Mr. Vargo discussed which involved the handlebar. 67 The
product in that case did not do what it was intended to do. 6 8 At
first it seemed like it was a flaw. That is why I said, when he
asked me what type of defect it was, that it did not matter. The
cases I label conscious design choice cases are the ones where the
product did what it was intended to do. 69 The question is, should
it have done more? They are the difficult design cases.
While I was indeed very skeptical of the use of judicial intervention in product design cases, in 1979, I wrote an article in the
71
Minnesota Law Review7" where I began to embrace that idea.

The new Restatement is certainly going to embrace that wholeheartedly.

because all that must be done in determining liability is to "determin[e] what
caused the products to fail in the first place." Id. at 1552.
67. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Wisniewski, 437 A.2d 700 (Md.
1981). The plaintiff bought a motorcycle and "[t]he alleged defect.., was
stated as an improper assembly of the throttle control clamp causing a clamp
screw to suddenly fracture. This, it [wa]s contended, permitted the throttle
control mechanism to come off the handlebar while the appellee was operating
his motorcycle." id. at 703.
68. Id. at 703-04.
69. See Henderson, supra note 64, at 1549 (These design choices are
"consciously intended and, for that reason, the risks that they generate are not
so likely to interfere directly with the products' intended functions. Most often
the risks of harm are associated with other unintended patterns of use.").
70. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over
Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging
Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773 (1978-79).
71. See Henderson, supra note 70, at 806 ("[T]he gradual formulation of a
consensus favoring cost-benefit analysis [by judges] has been accompanied in
some jurisdictions by a lamentable tendency of courts to routinely address
problems beyond their inherent competence.").
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Hon. George C. Pratt:
Mr. Vargo, do you have anything to add?
Mr. John Vargo, Esq.:
Very well. I started all of this. I agree with Stuart Madden,
Jerry Phillips, Oscar Gray and Peter Zablotsky. Thank you.
ProfessorOscar S. Gray:
I agree with a great deal of what has been said by my colleagues. I am very much encouraged, in particular, by much that
Professors Twerski and Henderson have said regarding the
changes that will be forthcoming, as stated in the proposed revision that was published in the Cornell Law Review. 72 Until I see
those changes, I cannot really comment on them, but I expect I
should agree with a good number of them.
I also agree with a great deal that was said by Professors Madden and Phillips. However, I must insert one nit-pick with regard
to Professor Phillips' remarks. I do not think it is quite fair to say
that the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) has taken a particular
position on items that are discussed in the recent Reporters' Study
on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury (Reporters'
Study). 7 3 The fact of the matter is that the A.L.I. went to con72. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The ProposedRevision
of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL.L. REv.
1512 (1992).
73. A.L.I.

REPORTERS'

STUDY,

ENTERPRISE

RESPONSIBIUMY

FOR

PERSONAL INJURY (1991) [hereinafter REPORTERS' STUDY]. The Reporters'

Study was presented to the American Law Institute five years after the A.L.I.

endorsed such study to examine the steep increases in products liability
insurance. 1 Id. at 3-7. The Reporters' Study was limited to personal injuries
"that [arose] out of product use, medical treatment, the workplace, and toxic
exposures in the environment." 1 Id. at 7. The recommendations were
formulated to address "substantive rules of liability governing these
activities;... procedures through which liability and compensation are
determined;"

insurance, both public and private;

and legislative and

administrative regulation of risk designated activities. 1 Id. at xi.
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74
siderable lengths to distance itself from that Reporters' Study,

and there is nothing in that study that represents the views of the
A.L.I.

75

Furthermore, as I indicated earlier, I tend to agree with Profes-

sor Henderson's position that it is not desirable to have legal
rules that force many socially responsible businesses out of business. 76 If it were true that there were extensive hazards that are

uninsurable, 77 I think that would be an important matter for concern.
I have been teaching insurance law for a number of years.
There is a great deal about insurance that I do not understand, as
there is a great deal about torts that I do not understand. How-

ever, as I suggested earlier, I have suspected that unforeseeable
hazards are in fact insurable, 7 8 and I was impressed by Mr.
74. In the forward of the Reporters' Study, Geoffrey Hazard, the Director
of the American Law Institute, explained the Council's divergent views on the
merits of some of the proposals, specifically that the Council had taken no
position on the study as a whole or on its particular proposals. I Id. at xii.
75. The special status of the report was further emphasized by a note
attached to the inside cover which stated:
This Reporters' Study has been published under a provision of the
Institute's Bylaws that authorizes the Council to publish documents even
though their contents have not been approved by the Council or the
membership. As stated in the legend on the title page, the contents do
not represent the position of the Institute.
76. See supra pp. 218-19.
77. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1542-43 (1987). The author provides a general
discussion of how the insurance system operates. He describes insurers as
agents of risk diversification who must identify risks that are independent
(uncorrelated) and aggregate them in order to reduce the total risk of the set. In
describing the effects of insurers attempts to exploit the "law of large
numbers," by spreading the risks efficiently throughout the insured
population, he emphasizes the problems faced by members of the risk pool
when such risks are not independent. Id. at 1539-43. "[The aiggregation of
such risks would be unproductive because the reserves of the insurer would
have to maintain would equal, or perhaps, exceed the reserves individuals
would have to maintain if uninsured ... this is why society-wide calamities,
such as nuclear war are uninsurable." Id. at 1543.
78. See Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, The AntiCompetitive Impact of U.S. Product Liability Laws: Are Foreign Businesses
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Crofton's suggestion that this is the case. 79 Professor Henderson's rebuttal of that serves as further evidence that he is at his
strongest when he places a law and economics analysis behind
him. 80 I do not believe the issue is resolved by developing narrow definitions of insurance. 81 Nor do I think it is consistent to

have insurance policies available today, containing normal limitations, such as deductibles or ceilings on liability, while not excluding unforeseeable risks. 82
I do not know what the limits are of insurance that can be sold,
but I suspect, based on what Mr. Crofton has said, that unforeseeable risks continue to be covered at a price. 83 Furthermore,
we do not have a widespread problem of manufacturers going out
of business due to their net worth being reduced by product li-

Beating Us at Our Own Game?, 9 J.L. & CoM. 167, 182 (1989) (reporting
that unforeseeable risks are insurable at dramatically increased premiums).
79. See Michael Crofton, From a Defense Attorney's Perspective: "There
Is No FreeLunch, " 10 TOUPO L. REV. 57, 58 (1993).
80. See Henderson, supra note 49.
81. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Performance of Liability Insurance in States
with Different Product Liability Statutes, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 809, 816-20
(1990). The author suggests that state statutes that limit product liability
definitions may reduce ambiguity once courts have interpreted the statutes,
however, until courts interpret the statutes, the ambiguous definitions
contribute to the unaffordability and unavailability of insurance. Id. at 816.
Furthermore, the author suggests the narrow definitions
provide a consistently more profitable context for product risk
insurance. It would be an oversimplification to conclude that it is the
definitions themselves driving this result. Because such definitions tend
to be an integral part of the statutory treatment of liability, a more
reasonable interpretation is that the definitions variable serves as a
proxy for statutory provisions that, on balance, foster a more profitable
environment for the insurer.
Id. at 820; cf. Priest, supra note 77, at 1548 (arguing that injured consumers
are benefited by narrow definitions of risk pools, because such definitions
increase "product sales, [since] the premium added to the price of the product
more closely approximates the consumer's expected loss .....").
82. See Richard A. Epstein, ProductsLiability as an InsuranceMarket, 14
J. LEGAL STD. 645 (1985).
83. See Crofton, supra note 79.
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ability claims to ten cents on the dollar. 84 It has not happened in
any industry that I know of in the United States, with the exception of asbestos 85 and Dalkon Shield 86 cases. However, those are
not cases of innocent producers. 87 Those are cases where what

happened to the companies was richly deserved by those companies. The notion that there is something economically distorted
about having insurance that is sold by underwriters who are taking a gamble, and therefore padding the price because they are
84. See W. KiP Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 214 (1991)
(suggesting that courts "are sending firms price signals that in effect enable
them to pay ten cents on the dollar for the economic value of the lives that will
be lost as a result of product risks. . . ."); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass
Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 870 (1984) (suggesting that courts' "proper
payout ratio could vary from [ten] cents on every [one dollar] claimed to a
full, dollar-for-dollar payout .. ").
85. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539
(N.J. 1982) (permitting recovery for injuries and wrongful deaths from the
manufacturer of a knowable risk of asbestos exposure). See Michael A.
Hiltzik, New York's Rules Seen Among Most Restrictive in Manville Case:
State Laws Bar Some Asbestosis Victims from Legal Relief, L. A. TIMES, Nov.
4, 1985, § IV at 1. In 1985, approximately 35,000 people injured by asbestos
exposure had filed suits against Johns-Manville causing it to file for Chapter
I1 and reorganize by "establish[ing] a claims fund financed by up to 80% of
its stock and $75 million annually from its profits." Id.
86. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); A.H.
Robins Co., v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876
(1986); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig.,
526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d
1210 (Kan. 1987).
87. See Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of
Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1269, 1311 (1993). The authors report that "[tiwo hundred thousand persons
will die from asbestos-related diseases by the end of the twentieth century.
Many of these deaths have resulted from asbestos manufacturers' active
concealment of the dangers of unprotected exposure." Id. at 1311 (footnotes
omitted). In a study conducted by the authors regarding products liability cases
from 1965 to 1990, they found that "[t]he majority of plaintiffs in these cases
were permanently or partially disabled as a result of the corporation not having
taken prompt remedial measures." Id. 1311-12. See also Tetuan v. A.H.
Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1240 (Kan. 1987) (finding Dalkon Shield
company intentionally concealed test results that product was unsafe, paid
money for favorable test results and marketed product with the knowledge of
its dangers).
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taking a gamble, 88 is something that is not self-evident. I think
you need to know more about what the numbers are before you
are able to come to a conclusion. I do not know what the numbers are, therefore I have not come to a conclusion.
I would like to expand on a point that Professor Henderson
confirmed at lunch today. For some time, studies have indicated
that a terrible burden exists on manufacturers due to products liability. Nevertheless, the cost of products liability, which is represented by the cost of products liability insurance, runs at approximately one percent of total manufacturing costs across the
board. 89 For example, in an industry with unusual hazards, underwriters may sell insurance at a highly padded premium in order to cover uncertainties. As Professor Henderson suggested, the
underwriters pad by approximately a factor of ten. 90 If the cost
of manufacturing products increases by nine percentage points,
representing the difference between insurance costs selling at one
percent of normal manufacturing costs and padding insurance by
a factor of ten, it is self-evident that you have a terrible result in
continuing to protect the consumer who is injured by a product
that was defective.
Moreover, I think the discussion regarding social insurance 91 is
a red herring. I recognize there are many more preferable ways
88. See, e.g., Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297,
1306 (9th Cir. 1987). In Clougherty, the court stated "[i]nsurance involves

transferring from the insured to the insurer the consequences of a possible
future event. The likelihood that a loss will occur is of uncertain but
predictable magnitude; the size of loss is similarly uncertain but predictable."

Id.
89. See generally U.S. GEN. AcCT. OFF., LtABiLrrTY INSURANCE:
EFFECrs OF RECENT "CRISIS" ON BUSINESSES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 32

(July 28, 1988) ("On average, as a percentage of annual gross receipts, small
businesses spent 1.0 percent on liability coverage for policy years 1985 and
1.2 percent for 1986.").
90. See supra p. 221.
91. Social insurance is defined as:
A comprehensive welfare plan established by law, generally compulsory
in nature, and based on a program which spreads the cost of benefits
among the entire population rather than on individual recipients. The
federal government began to use social insurance programs in 1935 with
the passage of the Social Security Act. The basic federal and state
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than lawsuits for paying consumers' hospital bills and the like. 92
If our society is prepared to implement alternative social safety
nets, I shall welcome them. If alternatives were implemented,
they would significantly impact tort law. In the absence of having
those safety net institutions, it seems fair to me to evaluate the
care and rehabilitation of accident victims and the protection of
their families through tort law.
Finally, I suggest that much of what you hear, regarding the
inefficiency of tort as a method of compensating accident victims,
is exaggerated. The numbers pertaining to the supposed cost of
tort compensation tend to reflect the inefficiency, not of tort as
such, but of negligence law in particular. You are talking about
the expense of the waste that is involved in worrying about riskbenefit analysis and otherwise disputing the existence of negligence. Tort law need not be that expensive if you have a strict liability system.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Professor Henderson, you asked to have a moment rebuttal.
ProfessorJames Henderson:
I will just make two remarks. One, I think it is one percent of
the gross domestic product, not the manufacturer's costs. Two, I
spent the first day and a half in my insurance course, Professor
approaches to social insurance presently in use are: Old Age, Survivors
and Disability Insurance (i.e. social security); Medicare and Medicaid;
unemployment insurance; and worker's compensation.
BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 806 (6th ed. 1990).
92. See generally 1 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 73, at 181-202
(discussing current programs of social insurance and possible alternatives to
obviate the tort compensation system); Jeffrey O'Connell, Alternatives to the
Tort System for Personal Injury, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 17 (1986)
(suggesting, as alternatives to social insurance, a statute providing defendants
with a choice between litigation or periodic payments, different insurance
policy or product warranty binding seller to compensate victims for economic
losses).
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Gray, working through a hypothetical to develop the distinction
between insurance and gambling.
ProfessorPeterZablotsky:
I am pleased that the discussion of misuse and a few other remarks prompted Professor Henderson to disclose a few secrets.
At the same time, I want to reassure you, speaking for the Touro
Law Review, the symposium issue will not be out in the next
three weeks, and your secrets are completely safe with us, so
thank you. Just one point. I still think that the ultimate and operative issue is whether the cumulative effect of the proposed
components of the product liability causes of action will be perceived as shifting the theories of liability. I think if we can agree
on that, we will have consensus. If not, that is where the discord
will arise. Thank you.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
I think that you should be aware, if you are not already, that
Professor Zablotsky is the one responsible for this entire symposium. Peter, you deserve a great deal of credit for assembling a
panel of such experience, knowledge and ability. For me, at
least, this has been a mind stretching experience. I think I have
bridged ten years in the circuit court. On behalf of the law
school, let me thank all the members of the panel for putting
aside many important things in coming here today and participating in the discussion. We hope that it has been as worthwhile to
you as it has been to us.
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